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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, and STATE OF
UTAH, by and through JOHN W.
ROLLY, Director, Utah State
.Trade Commission,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16555

-vsI.M.C. MINT CORPORATION,
ROBERT GRABOR, GEORGE E.
TWIBEY, et al. ,
Defendant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This a review of a decision of the Third District Court
wherein the court denied the state of Utah's claim for priority
payment toward the sales and withholding tax debts of the defendant from the assets held by the receiver.
DISPOSITION IN LOtVER COURT
The above captioned case was commenced when the defendant I.M.C. Corporation was ordered into receivership by the
Third District Court.

The Tax Commission timely filed its

claim of a preferred debt for sales and withholding taxes with
the receiver.

Formal objection to the state of Utah's claim of

priority over general unsecured creditors was accomplished by
the filing of a pleading to that effect.

An informal hearing

before the Honorable James S. Sawaya was held on the 15th day
of March, 1979.

Memoranda of Law were filed by counsel for the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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receiver and the State Tax Commission.

After due consideration

the district court sustained the receiver's objection to the
priority claims of the Utah State Tax Commission.

This appeal

. is from that particular order only.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Third District Court's
determination and a ruling that the state's claims for sales and
withholding taxes be declared superior to those claims of general
unsecured creditors.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
An informal hearing was held before the Honorable James

S. Sawaya on the 15th day of March, 1979, for the purpose of
hearing the receivers objection to the claims of the Utah State
Tax Commission for unpaid sales and withholding taxes.
Brief arguments were

(R. 485·n

heard and the Judge granted the request

of the tax commission's counsel for leave to file a written
memorandum of law on the issues involved with the state's claim
for priority over general,unsecured creditors.
filed by both parties.

(R. 455-484).

taining the receiver's objections.

Memoranda were

An order was issued sus-

(R. 485).

The sales and withholding tax amounts arose in the
following context.

Defendant, I.H.C. Mint was found to be con·

ducting business in Utah which was creating sales transactions
which are the proper subject of the Utah sales tax.

The tax

commission contacted the corporation by making a request for
audit arrangements and an application for a sales tax license.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

Through various acts

of the defendant, the audit arrangements

were not made,thereby preventing the tax commission from completing the audits for sales taxes until June 20, 1974.

In due

.course, the audit was sent to the defendant-taxpayer on June 25,
1974.

s.

In the meantime, a receiver was appointed by Judge James

Sawaya on June 21, 1974.

(R. 12-13).

As the receiver had

not yet notified the creditors, thereby putting the'commission
on notice of the receivership, the tax commission continued in
its normal procedure by mailing a notice of intent to file a
tax warrant dated September 11, 1974.
This dispute has arisen as the result of the receivership being established after the deficiency assessment but before
the state filed warrants.

The receiver asserts that the failure

to file warrants prior to the court ordered receivership leaves
the state without a tax lien and thus without a preference or
priority over general, unsecured creditors.

The tax commission

asserts that the state has a lien for sales and withholding
taxes independent of the warrant process.
POINT I.
THE GENERAL CREDITORS OF I.M.C. MINT
SHOULD TAKE SECOND POSITION BEHIND
THE CLAIM FOR TAXES AS UTAH IS FIRMLY
COMMITTED TO THE RULE THAT TAXES FOR
GENERAL GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES ARE
PARAMOUNT TO ALL OTHER DEMANDS AGAINST
THE TAXPAYER.
At this point in time in the receivership proceeding,
all that remains to be decided is whether the state's claims for
sales and withholding taxes are to be given priority over the
claims of general, unsecured creditors.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This court has repeatedly held fast to the basic rule of
tax law that "taxes for general governmental purposes, lawfully
imposed by the state, are paramount to all other demands against
the taxpayer, although the statute imposing the tax does not expres sly declare such priority."

Hanson v. Burris, 86 Utah 424,

46 P.2d 400 (1935) ,affinred in Ingrahamv. Hanson., 297
See also: Robinson v. Hanson, 75 Utah 30, 282 P.

u.s.

378 (1936)

782 (1929);

~

Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486 (1926).
The U.S. Supreme Court applied this basic principle to
the receivership setting.

In Marshall v. New York, 254

u.s.

380

(1920) the Court decided the exact issue involved in the present
case - whether the state "has priority in payment our of general
assets of the debtor over other creditors whose claims are not
secured by act of the parties nor accorded a preference, by
reason of their nature, by the state legislature or otherwise."
Id. at 382.

The Court noted the common law of England as incocyc

ated by state

constitution which established the sovereigns

priority for payment.

Such priority being effective whether the:

property was in the hands of the debtor or in custodia legis.
The Court applied this rule to find the receiver acted improper!);

in denying the states claim which had not become a lien under
the laws of New York at the time of the receivership.

Of speciai

relevance was the C.ourt 1 s observance that the state 1 s tax would

1

I

have been collectable by warrant had the receiver not been
appointed.

I

The Court then stated: "Since the prerogative right o:l

the State could not be enforced by levy and seizure, an applica·:
tion to the court for payment of the debt due was the appropriat·;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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!

remedy." Id. at 385.

In short, the court ordered the receiver

to pay the state's claim for taxes notwithstanding the fact that
the claim had not risen to the level of a lien.
As additional support for the proposition that this court
should order the receiver to pay the taxes in the instant case,
the appellant refers the court to Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co.,
Receiver, 286 U.S. 334 (1932).

The case will be discussed in more

detaiL infra, but basically it stands for the proposition that the
creation of a receivership should not be allowed to defeat a
state's claim for taxes accruing before or during a receivership.
As the instant case does not involve a dispute between
the state and creditors who can point to any preference or
priority which attaches to their claim, the statement of substantive law quoted above dictates that the state's tax claims
be satisfied prior to any disbursement to general creditors.
This must follow unless the creditors can point to any law to
the contrary which seeks to alter this established principle of
tax law.

The Robinson v. Hanson court explicitly so stated when

it pronounced:
[T]he priority of the sovereign
claims of the state will not be depreciated or denied without warrant
from the Legislature in clear and unmistakeable terms; . . . . 282 P. at 784
(emphasis added).
The receiver points to Rule 66(f) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure as modification of the rule of inherent superiority.

Appellant asserts that Rule 66(f) is only an attempt to

implement the rule of state superiority and any construction to
the contrary is without proper foundation in the law.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law where
Library. Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute
of Museumare
and Library
Services
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sufficient
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available
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to pay taxes, Rule 66(f) provides:
Before any personal property corning
into the hands of a receiver may be sold,
transferred or hypothecated, such receiver
shall pay and discharge any and all taxes
constituting a lien thereon legally levied
by any taxing unit of the state • • • •
The receiver argued below that 66 {f)'s language, "taxes
constituting a

lien~'

when coupled with the statement made in

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 22Utah 2d 177, 450 P.2d 100

(1969)~

that the state's lien "for delinquent withholding taxes

begins to run at the time notice thereof is given by filing Ue
warrant" mandated that only taxes accompanied by warrants were
preferred under Rule 66 (f).

The appellant maintains that i t was

error for the lower court to have adopted this view of the rule
for three reasons.
First,

by their own terms, Utah Rules of Civil Procedunl

are procedural only.

Utah R. Civ. P. l(a) reads:

(a) Scope of Rules: These rules
shall govern the procedure in the Supreme
Court, the district courts, city courts,
and justice courts of the State of Utah,
in all actions, suits and proceedings of
a civil nature, whether cognizable at law
or in equity . . . . (emphasis added).
These rules were promulgated pursuant to authority grant·
ed by Utah Code Ann. §72-2-4 which reads:
The Supreme Court of the State of
Utah has power to prescribe, alter, and
revise, by rules, for all courts of the
State of Utah, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings and motions and the practice and
1.

The Phillips decision will be discussed at some length infro,
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procedure in all civil and criminal
actions and proceedings, . . ~ . Such
rules may not abridge, enlarge, or
modif~ the substantive rights of any
litigant.
(emphasis added).
It seems clear that these Rules are promulgated to govern
judicial procedure and are not intended to contravene or create
any substantive law governing the people of the state of Utah.2
In fact, the appellant can imagine no reason why the
court would have desired to cut off the rights of the state to
claim priority for taxes in a receivership setting.

This court

upheld the taxes on a receivership while it operated a business 3
and in doing so fell in line with the majority position. 4

In the

absence of the receivership the state would have taken over
general creditors, so this author wonders why the court would
believe the state should not take a priority posture simply because no lien had arisen as of the time the receiver was appointed.
Secondly, even if Rule 66(f) was intended to do more than
establish procedural guidelines in a receivership proceeding it
could not constitutionally operate so as to change the substantive law applicable to the payment of debts due the state of Utah.
utah const. art.

v, section 1 mandates this when it reads:

The powers of the government of the
State of utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
2.

3.
4.

For case authority addressing this issue see generally Strahan
v. Strahan, 400 P.2d 542 (Wyo. 1965); Phoenix of Hartford v.
Harmony Restaurant, 560 P.2d 441 (Ariz. App. 1977).
Archer v. Arnovitz, 92 Utah 459, 70 P.2d 462 (1937).
See 66 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers §423.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.
Appellant submits that the creation of liens and the
~·

effect to be given thereto is a legislative function. See

Marion, 159 Ohio St. 290, 112 N.E. 2d 32, 36 (1953); State v.
Bi-Lo Foods, Inc., 383 P.2d 910 (Wash. 1963).

To place a con-

struction of Rule 66(f) so as to provide a modification of the
principle of law that the state's debts are inherently superior
to general, private obligations would be unconstitutional.

As

there are other constructions of the Rule which are constitution
the unconstitutional construction should be discarded.
Lastly, the Utah Supreme Court emphatically stated that
without a clear and unmistakable

mandate from the legislature

I

to the contrary, the state's general taxes would be preferred ove·l
other claims.

Robinson v. Hanson, 282 P. at 784.

That 66

(f) i:

not such a clear and unmistakable

mandate becomes clear by re-i

ferring to the words of the rule.

If no sufficient liquid asse:

are available to the receiver to satisfy the taxes constituting
a lien on personal property, the court may authorize a sale
the property prior to a payment of such taxes.

However,

ately upon receipt of the consideration for such sale . .

11

of

irnrned:

-~

receiver shall pay and discharge all such liens, taxes, and
within ten days thereafter shall file. . . evidence showing fuL
payment and discharge of all such taxes.

11

(emphasis added).
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The appellant submits that the receiver's duty to "pay
and discharge all such liens, taxes" under Rule 66(f) is simply
language which allows the receiver to comply with the law in
ensuring that the state is satisfied before the assets of the
business are distributed to the public.
The logic behind the general recognition of the unique
nature of a debt owned the state is apparent when one closely
examines the taxes.

With both taxes involved in this dispute

the taxpayers on whom they fall have already paid the tax.

In

the instant case, the taxpayers remitted the sales tax to the
defendant, I.M.C. Mint for transmission to the state.

Similarly,

I.M.C. Mint withheld projected income tax amounts from money owed
its employees and in so withholding, became a trustee for the
State of Utah.

See express language to this effect in Utah Code

Ann. §59-l4A-44(e).

Thus, the taxes the state seeks in this

case are inherently different from and are of a higher nature
than general and unsecured claims.
In summary, it is the state's contention that it's tax
claims are inherently superior to the claims of unsecured, general
creditors, that a receivership does not affect that superiority,
and that Rule 66(f) does nothing more than ensure that these
principles of law are uniformly carried out in all court-sanctioned
receiverships in Utah.
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POINT II.
RULE 66(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE REQUIRES THE STATE'S CLAIMS
FOR SALES AND WITHHOLDING TAXES BE
PAID PRIOR TO CLAIMS OF GENERAL
CREDITORS.
Rule 66(f) reads in part as follows:
Before any personal property may
be sold, transferred or hypothecated,
such receiver shall pay and discharge
any and all taxes constituting a lien
thereon, legally levied by any taxing
unit of the state, . •
In the present controversy there is no contention that
the tax amounts were not properly levied.

The only question

remaining before invoking the provisions of Rule 66(f) is

/

whether the sales and withholding taxes,which are the subject of
the state's claim,are liens.

I

The Tax Commission submits that

Rule 66 (f) makes no mention of perfected liens, nor does it dis· i
tinguish between perfected or unperfected lier.s.

It simply stat<!

that the receiver shall pay any and all taxes constituting a liet

I

The Commission maintains that the state did have a lien
for each type of tax for the stated amounts at the time the order
appointing a receiver was signed by the district court judge.

A!!

supported for this position the appellant directs attention to

I

Utah Code Ann. §59-14A-44 (e) which establishes a lien for withho:,
ing taxes when it reads:

"the State of Utah shall have a lien

to secure the payment of any amounts withheld and not remitted.
upon all of the assets of the employer and all property. . .whiC'
said lien shall be prior to any lien of any kind whatsoever in·
including existing liens for taxes."

(emphasis added).
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I

The Commission maintains that the above provision
establishes a lien as a matter of law at the moment in time when
both of the following have occurred:
(1)

The income tax has been withheld from the employee's

(2)

when the amount withheld was not remitted to the

pay; and

tax commission as required by law.
The Commission submits that Utah Code Ann. §59-15-10,
created a lien for the sales tax amounts due when the defendant
ceased doing business as a result of the appointment of a receiver.

§59-15-10 reads:

"The tax imposed by this Act [Emergency

Revenue Act of 1933 or Sales Tax Act] shall be a lien upon the
property of any wholesaler or retailer or proprietor who shall.
quit business . . . . "

(emphasis added).

It should be noted that neither of these taxing provisions is tied to the warrant statutes or procedures which may
also impose a lien on the property of a delinquent taxpayer. A
further observation is that these lien provisions do not mandate
any "perfection" criteria or other requirements which the state
must comply with prior to its being able to claim a lien against
the delinquent taxpayer's property.

The following discussion

will amplify the state's contention that it has a lien for purposes
of Rule 66 (f).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has had the
opportunity to construe a statutory scheme similar to Utah's
scheme in District of Columbia v. Hechinger Properties Co., 197
A. 2d 157 (1964).

Involved in Hechinger was the District of
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Columbia's claim for sales and withholding taxes against funds
held by a marshal for distribution to an attaching judgment
creditor.

The District's statutory scheme governing tax liens

is analogous to Utah's tax lien statutes.

D.C. Code 1961,

§47-1586g(f) (2) provides that:
The District of Columbia shall have a
lien upon all the property of any employer
who fails to withhold or pay over to the
collector sums required to be withheld under
this section.
If the employer withholds but
fails to pay over the amounts withheld to
the collector, the lien shall accrue on the
date the amounts were withheld.
If the
employer fails to withhold, the lien shall
accrue on the date the amounts were required
to be withheld.
In substance, this above-quoted provision is identical
to Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

f
(hereafter U.C.A.) §59-14A-44 (e) supra.!

Under D.C. Code §47-1586g(f) (2), the lien accrues on thej
dates the amounts were withheld.

Under §59-14A-44, the lien

arises when the amounts withheld are not remitted pursuant to
the statutory procedure.
The Hechinger case became even more relevant when it is
noted that the District of Columbia has a similar statute to
Utah's various warrant statutes.

D.C. Code 1961, §47-312 pro-

vides that when a person fails to remit the taxes due the district, the taxes may be collected in the manner prescribed in
§47-1406, which reads in part:
. . . [T) he collector of taxes, . . . may file
a certificate of such delinquent personal
tax with the clerk of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia,
which certificate from the date of its
filing shall have the force and effect, as
against the delinquent person named in such
certificate of the lien created by a judgment
granted
bydigitization
saidprovided
court
. . of .Museum
. and Library Services
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I

Again,the Utah counterpart to the above provision,
u.c.A. §59-14A-79, provides substantially the same collection
remedy as does the District's statutes.

Subparagraph (c) of

§59-14A-79 provides that "the tax commission may issue a warrant
. directed to the sheriff •

. commanding him to levy upon

and sell such person's real and personal property . •

" Sub-

paragraph (d) continues by providing that the sheriff shall file
a copy of the warrant with the clerk of the district court which
operates to create "a binding lien upon the real, personal and
other property of the taxpayer to the same extent as other judgments duly docketed in the office of such clerk."

Subparagraph

(e) states that once the warrant is filed, the tax commission
shall "be deemed to have obtained judgment against the taxpayer."
Having established the similarity of the two governments'
tax statutes, it is important to note how the Hechinger court
resolved the District's claims for taxes.

In that case, the

trial court had held that since the District had not filed its
certificate prior to the attachment proceedings, its claim to
taxes was subordinate to that of the attaching creditor.

In

holding in favor of the District, in its claim for priority for
withholding taxes, the court stated:
A lien created by statute exists independently of the various means of enforcement
which the statute permits.
If the lien is
given by the statute, further proceedings are
not necessary to fix the status of the property.
In our case a lien commenced at the time
the income was w1thheld, or on the date it should
have been withheld.
It was oerfected, it was
choate, at these times and no further action
was necessary to perfect it.
It has long
been regarded as a universal principle that a
prior lien gives a prior legal right which is
entitled to prior satisfaction out of the
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The construction given 47-1586g(f) (2)
by the trial court must be tested against
the intent and purpose of Congress. The
trial court held that the District has no lien
until i t records a withholding tax lien in the
United States District Court. But Section
47-312, by itself, with no reliance upon any
other statute, gives the District the right
to acquire a lien for taxes in the same
manner that liens for personal property taxes
are acquired, i.e., by filing a certificate
of delinquent taxes with the United States
District Court, pursuant to the authority of
Section 47-1406 of the Code.
If we uphold
the trial court's interpretation, Section
47-1586g(f) (2) is meaningless. We do not
believe Congress intended to enact a nullity
~n adopt~ng Sect~on 47-1586g(f) (2).
We think
that ~ts pur ose was clear -- to g~ve the
D~str~ct a l~en w ~ch ar~ses and ex~sts on
the date income taxes are withheld or are required to be w~thheld b~ the employer and has
priority over other cla~ms. Id. at 160
(emphasis added) .
The District of Columbia Court's unwillingness to render
a piece of legislation meaningless is a well accepted judicial
attitude founded on the rule of statutory construction that the
legislature intends that all its enactments should be given
effect. 5

Moreover, all statutes should be so construed, if

possible, by a fair and reasonable interpretation, as to give
full force and effect to each and all of them.

6

Furthermore,

it is not to be assumed that one or the other of related statute
is meaningless; rather, such statutes will be so construed as
to give each a field of operation.

7

This argument is especially applicable in light of
legislative action taken after a Utah Supreme Court case which
construed the predecessor to u.C.A. §59-14A-44(e), U.C.A.
5.
73 Arn.Jur.2d Statutes §253 and cases cited therein.
6.
Id.
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§59-14-79(3) (e).

In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 450

P.2d 100 (Utah 1969), the court declared that §59-14-79(3) (e)
did not give the State a lien priority over prior, existing
liens and that the state's lien for taxes begins to run at
the time notice thereof is given by filing the warrant.

Four

years later the Utah Legislature enacted identical language to
§59-14-71(3) (e) in the §59-14A-44(e).

In the same act (Individual

Income Tax Act of 1973), the legislature enacted §59-14A-79, the
warrant statute governing withholding taxes.
It would seem odd indeed for the Utah Legislature to
have revamped the State's entire income tax scheme in 1973 and
include §59-14A-44(e) and §59-14A-79(d) if it did not intend
for both lien statutes to have effect.

The fact that this

legislature used the exact language of §59-14-71(3) {e) in enacting §59-14A-44(e) four years after Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wagstaff, supra, reemphasizes their desire to give priority
treatment to tax liens over liens created by private parties to
the extent allowed by law.

(For discussion of what is allowed

under the Phillips case see Point IV, infra.)
The Commission submits that just as the Hechinger court
held that the District of Columbia'a recording-to-create-a-lien
statutes, §47-312 and 47-1406, were independent of any other
statutes, so are Utah's warrant statutes independent of lien
provisions found in U.C.A. §§59-14A-44(e) and 59-15-10.
Having disposed of the withholding tax dispute, the
Hechinger court considered the District's claim for sales taxes.
The private creditor again argued that the District's failure to
file Sponsored
a certificate
of delinquent taxes relegated its claim
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inferior to the creditor's claim.

In holding that the recording.

type statute and the lien-arising-as-a-matter-of-law statute
were independent provisions, the court noted:
we construe §47-2610 as a mere permissive way ("may" be collected) in which
the District of Columbia can give notice, if
it desires, to creditors or potential creditors
of its prior claims.
197 A.2d at 161.
Just as the D.C. Code

§47-2610, read "may be collected," U.C.A.

§59-14A-79(c), states that the "tax commission may issue a
warrant."
To adopt the interpretation of Utah's lien statutes that
the court did in Phillips, supra, is to render §59-14A-44(e)
meaningless, an act this court should seek to avoid.
The Commission urges this court to adopt the position
of the highest Court of the District of Columbia.

This is done

in an effort to preserve that generally accepted proposition that
the maintenance of all the vital governmental services depends
upon the raising of the necessary revenue to fund the same.
See Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, supra, at 488; Schlothan
v. Territory of Alaska, 276 F.2d 806

(1960).

The receiver attempted to dismiss the helpfulness of
the Hechinger case by observing that a District statute gave
taxes priority treatment in a receivership setting irrespective
of whether they constitute liens.

This observation is irrelevant

because an undisturbed trial court ruling found the dispute
was outside the scope of the priority statute, thereby rendering
the appellate court's construction of the lien statutes very
much in point.

The appellant recognizes that the Hechinger

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

1

decision cannot be totally consonant with the Phillips Petroleum
co. v. Wagstaff, supra, but the appellant asserts that Hechinger

is a better reasoned case when applied to the facts of the instant
controversy where it is only important to decide if the state has
a lien for purposes of Rule 66(f).

For an extensive discussion

of Phillips decision see Points III and IV, infra.
The interpretation of the Utah lien statutes proffered
by the

Commissio~

is strengthened by referring to two rules of

general lien law stated below.

In Lannan v. Waltenspiel,45 Utah 564

147 P. 908, 909 (1915), the court stated that "Statutes giving
a lien are remedial and therefore to be liberally construed, and
so construed
added).

as to accomplish the legislative purpose " (emphasis

To this same effect,see Kerr-McGee Oil Industries v.

W.J. McGary, 361 P.2d 734, 89 Ariz. 307 (1961): Dewar v. Hagans,
146 P.2d 208, 61 Ariz. 207 (1944): Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc.,
561 P.2d 750, 114 Ariz. 426 (1977); Peterson-Donnelly Engineers &
Contractors Corp. v. First National Bank of Arizona,

Phoeni~

408

P.2d 841, 2 Ariz. App. 321 (1966): International Harvester Credit
Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537, 544 (1956).
The other rule the Commission cites for support was enunciated in Dutt v. Marion Air Conditioning Sales, 112 N.E. 2d 32, 36
(Ohio 1953),where the court said: "[T]he question, whether a
statutory lien on property generally sould prevail over a specific lien on particular personal property, is ordinarily a legislative and not a judicial question."
The Commission maintains that U.C.A. §§59-14A-44(e) and
59-15-10 are indicative of a legislative intent to give priority
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to the tax claims of the state.

The Commission further asserts

that Rule 66{f) was set up to implement the state's preference
over other creditors and not as a technicality to serve as a
roadblock or divest the state of priority it would have otherwise had in the absence of the receivership.

As to this latter

point it sould be observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that at times a receivership goes beyond its purpose
of conservation of assets and liquidation of a business when
it stated:
Receiverships for conservation have
at times a legitimate function, but they
are to be watched with jealous eyes lest
their function be perverted. .
To
protect through a receiver the enjoyment
of the corporate privilege and then to
use the appointment as a barrier to the
collection of the tax that should accompany
enjoyment would be an injustice to the
State and a reproach to equity. Michigan
v. Michigan Trust Co., Receiver, 286 U.S.
334, 345-346 {1932)B(emphasis added).
This statement becomes very relevant in light of the
fact that the Michigan court ordered the receiver to pay the
franchise tax which had accrued the year prior to the
ment of the receivership.

8

establis~

To this effect the court stated:

For a statement in a similar vein, see State v. Bradley, 207&
677, 93 So. 595,596 (1922) where the court stated: "It is th
manifest duty of a receiver of an existing domestic corporatio:
to satisfy out of the funds in the receiver's hands all valid tal
or governmental impositions in that nature imposed by the
corporation's creator that would have been demandable of the
corporation had the receivership not been created."
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Taxes owing to the Government, whether
due at the beginning of a receivership or
subsequently accruing, are the erice that
business has to pay for protect~on and
security." citing Coy v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co., 220 Fed. 9~ 92, 286 u.s. at 344
(emphasis added)
The Commission merely urges this court to follow the
intent of the legislature in providing for the payment of debts
due the state before private debts are paid.
POINT III.
PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT THE
STATE'S CLAIM FOR WITHHOLDING
TAXES BE SUPERIOR TO ALL LIENS
Appellant maintains that cases upholding statutes which
grant state tax claims priority over other obligations are well
reasoned in light of the nature of the obligations involved.
The Utah decisions which recite the state's inherent claim for
priority over general obligations have stated their reasons for
doing so.

In Robinson v. Hanson, 75 Utah 30, 282 P. 782, 784

(1929) the court stated:
The first and paramount necessity
for social order, personal liberty, and
private property is the maintenance of
civil government; and government cannot
exist without revenues. The necessity
and importance of preferring the lien
for general taxes over other claims are
so impelling that the priority of the
sovereign claims of the state will not
be depreciated or denied without warrant
from the Legislature in clear and unmistakable terms.
In Union Cent. Life v. Black, 67 Utah 268, 247 P. 486,
488 (1926) the court noted:
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It has been held frequently that a tax
lawfully imposed by the state on its citizens
is not an ordinary debt, but is an obligation
which by its very nature should be regarded
as paramount to all other demands against
the taxpayer • . •
Such decisions proceed
on the theory that the maintenance of good
government and the public welfare are to
such an extent dependent upon the prompt
collection of taxes that demands of that
nature should take precedence of all claims
founded upon pr~vate contracts."
(emphas~s added) .

The need for these revenues is never more apparent than
it is right now when the lack of state revenue has caused a stat1
reduction in all budgets.

This has had the direct impact of

cutting off government service in the welfare area and in variou;
service arms of the government.
To follow the Phillips decision and ignore the legislative mandate to prefer withholding tax claims over prior secured
creditors notwithstanding a notice giving warrant is to deal
state treasury a double blow.

~e

Not only has the state been de-

pri ved of revenue it was relying upon to come from the defaulting employer to fund necessary services, but in many instances t:
state must deplete other needed and appropriated funds.

This

occurs when the employee of the defaulting employer files for ani
receives his or her income tax refund.

It is obvious that the

legislature singled out the withholding tax as the only tax
needing special procedures to guarantee vital revenue at the
expense of prior lien holders - even tax-lien holders.
In Union Cent. Life v. Black, supra, this court recognized that circumstances surrounding the public debt will save a
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collection procedure from constitutional attack when it cited
another court decision as follows:
The fact has also been recognized
from time immemorial that every sovereignty ought to be armed with the requisite power to enforce the collection
of taxes without fail, and to compel
the prompt payment of whatever imposts
it sees fit to levy for its own support.
In view of that necessity it has been a
common practice to provide summary remedies for enforcing such demands, which
have been upheld by the courts whenever
assailed, although it is quite probable
that some of the remedies so provided
could not have been sustained as affording due process of law, if the proceedings had related to the collection of
purely private debts.
247 P. at 488
(emphasis added).
Appellant asserts that the state's need for revenue and
the legislature's recognition of that outweighs the notice considerations stated in the Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff
decision.

To the extent that the court finds the Phillips

decision dispositive of this case, the appellant asks this court
to overrule that decision.

The legislative decision to limit

this powerful collection tool to withholding taxes was a prudent
use of its authority which was founded on a recognition of the
peculiar problems attendant to that tax.
As to the notice issue, several courts have considered the require1nents of sufficient notice when a state tax
has been involved.

At issue in Schlothan v. Territory of Alaska,

276 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1960),was the priority of liens between a
mortgagee and the Territory of Alaska.

As in Phillips, the

mortgagee had a recorded 1nortgage predating any recorded lien
for taxes due the Territory of Alaska.

The territory had a
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statute which provided that the lien for taxes was "prior,

"1

paramount and superior to all other liens, mortgages •
(Compare with Utah Code Ann. §59-14A-44(e).

The court

rejected the mortga9ee's constitutional due process at~ack
when it held that the mortgagee is "chargeable with knowing of the lien provisions of chapter 82.

Hence, . • . [the

mortgagee] had constructive notice that when Einstoss [the mortg·
I

agor and defaulting taxpayer] acquired title to her property a
paramount inchoate lien would immediately attach.

This

notice was sufficient to meet the requirements of due process."
I~

at 811.

The Schlothan court cited as support, International

Harvester Credit Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537, 76 S. Ct. 621
100 L.Ed. 681 (1956), wherein the court upheld a New York State
Highway tax.

The New York statute imposed a lien for highway

use taxes which was paramount to all prior liens or encumbrances
of any character.

In upholding the state's priority, the court

rejected a due process attack,noting that the statute imposing
the lien gave ample notice of the tax and the provisions of its
collections. 350U.S. at 543-44.

For

further discussion in the

constitutional area, see Terri tory of Alaska v. Craig Enterprises,
355 P. 2d 397 (Alaska 1960), where the court discusses many other
cases which have considered the notice issue surrounding socalled "secret" liens of states for taxes.
to the case

Of_ special relevance

at hand was the Craig Enterprises case where

the court upheld the state's statute providinq priority
treatment for state tax claims.

The court applied a balancing

standard in finding that such a statute did not overpass the
bounds of reason.

See 355 P.2d at 402.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

!

For a recentcasewhere the court upheld the state's
right to prefer public obligations over prior private debts,
see Wasson v. Hogenson, 583 P.2d 914

(Colo. 1978).

In summary, the appellant believes that the Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff decision is not controlling of the
instant case and is distinguishable therefrom. 9
were controlling, it should be overruled. 10

9.

Even if it

For further discussion of this position see Point IV, infra.

10. For further discussion of this position see Point II, supra.
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POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURTS RELIANCE ON THE
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. V. WAGSTAFF
CASE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AS THE INSTANT
CONTROVERSY INVOLVES DIFFERENT CONCEPTS
THAN WERE THERE INVOLVED.
Counsel for the receiver would urge this court to find
that Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wagstaff, 22 Utah 2d 177, 450
P.2d 100 (1969), is controlling in the matter at hand.

The

Phillips case involved a suit to foreclose a mortgage wherein
the State of Utah asserted that its liens for delinquent withholding taxes were superior to the mortgage

by reason of a

statute stating that the lien of the State "shall be prior to
any lien of any kind whatsoever."
The court decided in favor of the mortgagee by holding
that the State's lien for withholding taxes only begins to run
at the time notice thereof is given by filing the warrant.

The

appellant submits that this holding simply reflects the court's
recognition of, and strict adherence to, the system of recordation

I

of all matters affecting real property.

I

I

Practically speaking,

the court's holding directs the State to comply with the recording and notice provisions of the recording statutes if it wishes
to resort to the real property of the delinquent taxpayer in
seeking satisfaction of the debt due the State.
It is possible to reach this conclusion by referring
the State's various lien statutes.

In the statutes creating

sales, use, income, franchise and privilege taxes, the 1 egislatu:l'
established a procedure for lien creation.

In each statute,

I

where the legislature expressly creates a lien upon real proper:\
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express direction is given to the Tax Commission to docket a
warrant in the District Court.

However, where no express mention

of real property exists (U.C.A. §59-15-10 and S59-14A-44(e)), the
legislature gives no directions at all concerning the docketing
of a warrant.

Appellant submits

that this possibly demonstrates

a legislative intent to subject the Tax Commission to the sacrosanct real property recording system before granting any
priority to the State for taxes.

The foregoing analysis also

recognizes that no such complete and conclusive record exists
in other property areas.
Thus, as the State's current claim for taxes is made
against assets for which there is no all encompassing system
wherein claims can be established or protected, the reasoning
behind the Phillips decision is simply inapplicable.

Especially

is this so in this case,where the creditors involved did not
rely on any record in extending credit the way a secured party
does.

A general creditor may seek out a potential debtor's

financial condition before extending credit, but he does not
depend on a particular asset to have a fixed value which will
be available to him,and no one else,if a default occurs and
resort to the security is needed.
The legislature's passage of statutes containing
identical language as was construed in Phillips Petroleum v.
Wagstaff four years subsequent to that decision, may be argued
to be the recognition of this construction.
The considerations involved in the Phillips case are
absent from the present one and it should not be controlling
by the S.J.controversy.
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CONCLUSION

The State's claims for sales and withholding taxes were
appropriately made.·

The fact that a receivership was ordered

before the State could perfect and execute upon its liens shouU
not operate to cut off the state's claims for taxes in favor of
general, unsecured creditors.

This is especially true in light

of the fact that it was the debtor-taxpayers own actions of
failing to file true and correct tax returns which prevented
the State from perfecting its lien.
The lower court erred in finding that a rule of civil
procedure operated to divest the State of its inherently paramount claim for taxes, relegating it to the level of a general
creditor.

Appellant asks this court to order the receiver to

pay all sales and withholding taxes prior to any payment to
general, unsecured creditors.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN

Attorney General

MARK K. BUCHI

Assistant Attorney General
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